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No, Prime Minister: Explaining the House of 
Commons’ Vote on Intervention in Syria 
Juliet Kaarbo and Daniel Kenealy, University of Edinburgh 
Forthcoming in European Security 
 
On 29 August 2013 the UK House of Commons inflicted the first defeat on a Prime 
Minister over a matter of war and peace since 1782. Recalled to debate and vote on UK 
intervention in Syria, the Commons humbled the government and crucially impacted the 
development of UK foreign policy. This article places that vote, and the developments 
leading to it, in the context of the role of parliaments in security policy and explores the 
relationships between parliamentary influence, leadership, intra-party and intra-coalition 
politics, and public opinion. From an in-depth analysis of leaders’ statements and 
parliamentary debate, we find a combination of intra-party politics and party leadership 
were most significant. An additional factor – the role of historical precedent – was also 
important. Our analysis explores the fluidity and interconnectedness of the various factors 
for parliamentary influence in foreign policy and offers directions for future theoretical 
development and empirical research.  
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‘A leader humbled, a nation cut down to size’ (Rachman 2013). That was how one 
commentator summarised the 29 August 2013 vote in the House of Commons, a vote 
that resulting in the first defeat for a British prime minister (PM on a matter of war 
and peace since 1782.1 Just a few days earlier, PM David Cameron had been 
confident of securing parliamentary support for UK participation in a U.S.-led 
military strike against Syria. The vote took the possibility of UK military involvement 
off the table. The vote triggered calls for parliamentary debate in Paris and 
Washington. Ultimately, no military strikes against Syria were taken at that time. In 
the words one Labour MP, ‘this was a great parliamentary moment and it did affect 
events. There was no bombing’ (BBC 2014). 
This was an unusual case of a parliament defying a PM’s preference on a decision 
to deploy military force. This vote was unprecedented in UK politics and challenges 
conventional wisdom that Westminster has little influence in security policy. Yet this 
case also resembles instances of parliamentary influence elsewhere and the factors 
that explain this vote are consistent with other cases. After a brief description of the 
backdrop to the vote, we establish the theoretical context of parliaments’ role in 
security policy, setting out the general expectation that parliaments are not 
particularly influential. At the heart of the article we consider – through a 
consolidation of previous research – factors that facilitate parliamentary influence in 
security policy and examine the impact they each had in the Syria vote. In concluding, 
we use this case to suggest directions for future research. Our aim is to explain this 
particular vote and to advance research and understanding about the role of 
parliaments in security policy. We ground our analysis of parliamentary influence in a 
conceptualisation of political dynamics focusing on group and individual actors from 
a decision-making perspective. 
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The Domestic and International Context of the Vote 
Cameron’s preference for some form of intervention in the Syrian conflict was long 
signposted. As early as May 2011 he adopted a hawkish line and announced, in 
March 2013, that he was seriously considering arming the Syrian rebels, in violation 
of an agreed EU arms embargo (Stacey et al. 2013). This was consistent with 
Cameron’s established instinct towards liberal interventionism, most prominently 
displayed in response to the Libyan civil war of 2011 (Beech 2011; Beech and Oliver 
2014). After the 21 August 2013 chemical attack in Damascus, Cameron and Obama 
agreed that a robust response was required from the international community if 
credible evidence suggested the Syrian government was responsible (Chulov and 
Helm 2013). 
Syrian president Assad agreed to admit UN inspectors to the attack site the next 
day, after suggestions from both US and UK governments that military action was 
likely. The inspectors arrived in Syria on 26 August but struggled to gain access to the 
sites, delaying completion of their work (BBC 2013b). Military commanders in the 
US, France, and the UK began to discuss plans for a 48-hour cruise missile attack 
against military assets inside Syria (Financial Times 2013). In an attempt to build 
legitimacy for any strike, the UK moved to secure a UN Security Council resolution 
(Ross 2013). It quickly became clear that both Russia and China opposed such a 
resolution (BBC 2013c). Regional actors such as Iran criticised any military action 
while Jordan announced it would not permit any strikes to be launched from its 
territory.  
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Against this backdrop of division and uncertainty in the international community, 
Cameron returned early from vacation and recalled Parliament for a vote. Alongside 
William Hague (UK Foreign Secretary) and Nick Clegg (UK Deputy PM and Leader 
of the Liberal Democrats in the coalition government), Cameron met with opposition 
Labour party leader Ed Miliband on 27 August. At that meeting, Miliband stressed 
that support from Labour would only be offered for action that was ‘“legal, 
specifically limited to deterring the future use of chemical weapons” and has “clear 
and achievable military goals”’ (Rigby and Pickard 2013). In a call to Cameron that 
evening, Miliband reportedly emphasised the need to give the UN inspectors time to 
conclude their work (Pickard et al. 2013). 
The following day Miliband met again with Cameron and was shown a draft of 
the government motion – authorising the use of military force – that would be put 
before the Commons. Reports differ as to whether Miliband indicated he would 
support the government but by the end of 28 August it was clear that Miliband’s 
Labour opposition would not offer such support. Instead the opposition would table a 
separate motion – a roadmap to the use of force emphasising the need for a full report 
from UN inspectors before any action – to be voted on alongside the government 
motion. This prompted Cameron to amend his own motion to make it clear that a 
second vote would be required prior to any UK military action (Mason 2013). 
Labour’s shadow foreign secretary, Douglas Alexander, stated that members of his 
party ‘were open to supporting the government … We were continuing, throughout 
that week, to probe and ask questions … [It is] not the job of the opposition to give a 
blank cheque to a government contemplating military action’ (BBC 2014). A 
government insider has suggested that Miliband expressed clear support on Tuesday 
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only to equivocate on Wednesday, sniffing a chance to score a political win (BBC 
2014). 
MPs convened on Thursday, 29 August to debate and vote on a government 
motion and an opposition amendment that were very similar: both called for a second 
vote to be held before any military action.2 One government insider remarked that 
there was ‘bugger all’ between the two (BBC 2014). Cameron opened the debate with 
a forceful statement, which sought to: establish the legality of any strikes in the 
absence of an explicit UN Security Council resolution; reinforce the idea that no UK 
military involvement would occur without a second, explicit vote in Parliament; 
emphasise the difference between proposed action in Syria and the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq; and stress that any military action would be a narrow response to the use of 
chemical weapons and not the beginning of a broader effort at regime change or deep 
involvement in the on-going conflict (Hansard, 29 Aug 2013: Col. 1425-40).  
Despite Cameron’s arguments, hours later the government motion was defeated. 
The outcome of the vote was stunning. Neither motion was supported. The 
government proposal was defeated 285 to 272 votes. Cameron, visibly surprised, 
confirmed that the UK would not participate in military action against Syria under any 
circumstances and that he had no intention of bringing the issue back to the Commons 
for further consideration.  
 
 
Parliamentary Influence in Security Policy 
The vote presents a challenge to conventional understandings of parliamentary 
influence in security policy and to the traditional picture of the Commons in the 
Westminster model of governance. Indeed, the vote surprised Cameron and many 
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observers of British politics given the UK parliament’s weak reputation in foreign 
policy generally, and security policy specifically, and its tendency when consulted to 
respond with strong cross-party consensus in support of PMs’ preferences (see Joseph 
2013). Exceptions include opposition to Tony Blair’s position on Iraq in 2003 from 
within his own party, but overall, the Commons has been described as ‘weak and 
reactive: a legislature that chooses never to bite, a tiger muzzled by partisan politics’ 
(Heffernan 2005: 68). As Hill (2003: 255) notes ‘executives have been able to 
circumvent parliamentary powers without difficulty’. 
This reading of the role of the Commons in security policy resonates with general 
conventional wisdom on parliamentary influence (Author 2010). Indeed, there is little 
systematic research on parliaments’ role in security policy because it is assumed that 
parliaments are unimportant (see Peters and Wagner 2011). Despite appointment by 
and accountability to parliament, cabinets generally lead in decision-making and 
parliaments follow, often only rubber-stamping decisions. As Weaver and Rockman 
(1993: 17) argue, a ‘determined parliamentary government can...do as it wishes, so 
long as it has a legislative majority.’ Modern political parties have multiple 
mechanisms for enforcing party discipline and most votes predictably support the 
government’s position.  
Parliaments are particularly weak in ‘high politics’ and security policy (see Ku 
2004). Parliaments lack the knowledge and expertise to challenge powerful foreign 
and defence ministries and ‘most parliamentarians remain quite parochial and national 
in their concerns’ (Greene 2004: 30). In addition, the need to present a united front 
toward ‘the enemy’ is a security imperative by which parliaments often abide. 
Legislative deference to government and party leaders is quite common and once 
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hostilities commence, parliamentarians tend to rally behind the government (Peters 
and Wagner 2011).  
Recent research, however, challenges this conventional view of parliamentary 
weakness in security policy (Author 2010). Work inspired by Putnam’s (1988) two-
level game metaphor has examined how parliaments can shape domestic win-sets (the 
range of acceptable options to domestic constituents) through ratification and veto 
powers, which affects both the likelihood of international agreements and the 
advantages that domestic constraints can give leaders in international bargaining 
(Pahre 1997; Martin 2001; Hill 2003). Research on the role of political oppositions 
(Hagan 1993) and decision units (Hagan and Hermann 2001) also notes the 
importance of parliaments as centres for opposition and as potential veto players in 
fluid and dynamic decision making practices that exist alongside institutional 
authority. Parliamentary accountability is identified as one mechanisms underlying 
the structural explanation of the democratic peace (the notable lack of war between 
dyads of democracies) (Wagner 2006). Dietrich et al. (2008) argue that the 
democratic peace should be characterised as the ‘parliamentary peace’ because 
parliaments are the democratic institutions most likely to respond to war-averse public 
opinion. Unpacking the structural explanation of the democratic peace, research has 
examined varying levels of parliamentary constraints. This diverse research 
demonstrates the presence of parliaments in foreign and security policy and offers 
implicit suggestions on the conditions under which parliaments are important.3 
From this wide-ranging research, we consolidate and specify several facilitating 
factors for parliamentary influence in security policy. They include: 
 
• Institutional powers of parliament;  
 8 
• Public opinion;  
• Cabinet type;  
• Intraparty factions; and  
• Prime Ministerial (PM) leadership style.  
 
These factors can, and often do, act together, but here we present the logic of 
each separately. Furthermore, none are deterministic; there are caveats to the logic of 
each of them. Following a comparative, general analysis of factors for parliamentary 
influence in foreign and security policy, we apply these to the Syria vote.  
 
Institutional, Legal and Constitutional Authority 
Parliaments with more institutional, legal, and constitutional authority in foreign 
affairs are in a better position to influence security policy. Research on two-level 
games, decision units, and the democratic peace notes real variation in parliamentary 
powers in foreign affairs (see Pahre 1997; Wagner 2006; Mello 2012). Born (2004: 
209-11) classifies parliamentary powers in security affairs in terms of ‘authority’ (‘the 
power which Parliament uses to hold government accountable ... derived from the 
constitutional and legal framework as well as customary practices’), ‘ability’ (the 
parliamentary resources of special committees, budget and staff necessary to use legal 
authority), and ‘attitude’ (the ‘willingness to hold the executive to account’). Focusing 
specifically on legal and constitutional war powers (including budgetary control, 
oversight, and the right to veto executive use of force), Peters and Wagner (2011: 
175) find a range of models parliamentary roles, ‘from complete exclusion to a 
comprehensive veto position of parliament over all potential deployments. In between 
these two extremes, democracies have found a wide variety of solutions’. They report, 
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for example, that less than one third of democracies hold ex ante veto power over 
military missions (Peters and Wagner 2011).  Democratic peace research that unpacks 
institutional accountability in parliaments has also focused on the degree of executive 
autonomy from the legislature and treaty ratification powers (Peterson 1995). 
These differences have policy consequences. Consider the Iraq case: countries 
with parliaments having only ‘basic’ or ‘deficient’ war powers became more involved 
militarily, while those with ‘comprehensive’ powers made little or no contribution 
(Dieterich et al. 2008). In their study on variation in treaty ratification procedures, 
Reiter and Tillman (2002) found that countries affording stronger voice to  
legislatures in treaties were less likely to initiate militarized interstate disputes. 
Beyond formal ratification and war powers, parliaments can play an important role in 
security policy through their ability to supervise, scrutinize, and investigate, and 
through budgetary controls (Hill 2003). 
Some argue there is a trend toward institutionalisation of parliamentary influence 
in foreign affairs (Damrosch 2003; Raunio and Wiberg 2001). Yet, in their study of 
post-Cold War trends in parliamentary powers, Peters and Wagner (2011: 185) 
conclude that veto powers have not increased and that ‘parliaments usually lose 
powers when existing provisions are substantially modified’. Furthermore, they argue 
that NATO expansion and the rise of multilateral operations negatively affected 
parliamentary control over deployment decisions. 
There are three important caveats to the institutional, legal, and constitutional 
authority factor. First, as Pahre (1997) notes, it can be misleading to think of 
parliamentary power as separate from, and exogenous to, cabinets and executives in 
parliamentary systems since the executive is born out of the parliament and the parties 
in the cabinet are also in the legislature. Second, decision units research (on the 
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different types of decision units that can form with each decision point) shows that 
policy authority is often more fluid than implied by strictly institutional or 
constitutional readings of parliamentary powers (Hagan and Hermann 2001). Which 
players are involved in decision-making and whether parliament chooses to use its 
powers is often contested and sometimes negotiated by domestic political actors and 
can depend on political conditions. Third, research on partisanship in security policy 
suggests that institutional power-sharing alone is not sufficient to explain 
parliamentary influence (Mello 2004; Schuster and Maier 2006). Party ideology 
matters in security policy – not all PMs and cabinets are pro-intervention and not all 
parliaments are pro-peace.  
 
Public Opinion 
Security issues that are salient to the public, and public opinion that challenges the 
government’s preference, can facilitate parliamentary influence in security policy 
(Reiter and Tillman 2002; Dietrich et al 2009; Author 2010). If the cabinet is out of 
touch with the sense of the country, parliaments may play their role of representing 
the will of the people. Unlike the cabinet, which is accountable to parliament, MPs are 
directly accountable to and elected by the public. Thus, MPs not serving in 
government may be more sensitive to public opinion and see public opposition as an 
opportunity to make electoral gains, particularly if an election is looming.  
This is especially true for opposition parties. With few other routes for 
influencing policy, opposition parties can seize on public opinion to force a role for 
parliament in foreign policy. Given public opposition, ruling parties may also use 
parliaments to provide legitimacy for security operations and to avoid subsequent 
criticism by parliamentary opposition. According to Peters and Wagner (2011: 183-
 11 
84) this may, in certain cases, ‘give parliamentarians some influence on the operation 
… consultations may become such a common practice that it develops into a de facto 
obligation that is acknowledged by both government and parliament even in the 
absence of any legal obligation’. 
One caveat to this factor is that public opinion may have a direct impact on 
foreign policy, completely bypassing parliament. In other words, the PM and cabinet 
may also be sensitive to public opposition and change policy to comply. Evidence for 
this direct role of public opinion is decidedly mixed (see Holsti 2002). It is more 
likely that parliament and government together persuade and manipulate public 
opinion to support a policy, or ignore it altogether (Kreps 2010; Rathbun 2004; 
Schuster and Maier 2006). Denmark and Lithuania are cases where substantial 
parliamentary war powers exist and where public opinion opposed participation in the 
2003 Iraq war, but where both governments supported intervention anyway (Dieterich 
et al. 2008). Finally, as Peters and Wagner (2011: 183-84) note, ‘when the 
involvement of parliament is exclusively at the government’s discretion, there is a 
fine line between meaningful consultation with parliament and the goal of simply 
having executive decisions rubber-stamped’.  
 
Coalition Government 
A governing elite that is divided and institutionalised in a coalition government is 
another factor facilitating parliamentary influence in security policy. Coalitions are 
often seen as inherently fragile and weak, and more vulnerable to parliamentary 
pressures (Auerswald 1999; Palmer et al. 2004).   Whereas a single party cabinet ‘can 
count on legislative approval for its … policy positions largely because voting against 
the government implies handing it over to the opposition’, coalition partners may 
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disagree over security policy and then may go to parliament to seek support from 
other parties (Elman 2000: 98). For this reason, and the built-in multiple veto players 
coalitions, democratic peace researchers have argued that coalitions will be more 
constrained in security policy than single0party counterparts (Maoz and Russett 
1993). 
Others suggest the dynamics of coalition politics can produce hijacking of policy 
by junior parties with blackmail potential and disproportionate influence and 
diversionary behaviour with extreme foreign policies designed to distract publics and 
parliaments from coalition fragility  (Hagan 1993; Elman 2000). Quantitative research 
on this question has produced mixed results. Coalitions are associated with more 
extreme foreign policies, and coalitions with less parliamentary strength engage in 
more extreme behaviours, suggesting unique dynamics between coalitions and 
parliaments (Author 2014). Some qualitative research also suggests an increased role 
for parliaments during coalition governments as junior partners may seek to move the 
locus of authority to parliament where they perceive support from other others for 
their position (Author 1996; Author 2012). 
Three caveats are important. First, coalition partners often agree on security 
policy, leaving no room for parliamentary intervention. Second, coalition partners 
often work out their differences within the coalition. Even if the government falls 
over a security policy issue, it may be due to one partner withdrawing from the 
coalition and parliament may not be involved. Finally, coalitions may act no 
differently than factionalized single parties. Leblang and Chan (2003) argue that 
consensual politics of intra-party consultation may be just as constraining as 
competitive politics of inter-party consultation.  
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Intraparty Factionalism 
When leaders cannot discipline their party, parliaments become involved in decision-
making. Parties may be factionalized on the specific policy, on the general policy 
orientation, or on personal or political lines for which foreign policy may be 
strategically used to shore up support intra-party party. Although there is little work 
on the effects of intraparty politics on foreign policy (see Hazan 2000), research on 
political oppositions suggests that single-party governments with ‘well-defined 
internal divisions’ may have to deal with difficult parliamentary backbenchers (Hagan 
1993). 
One caveat is that even if divisions exist, leaders have many institutional, 
political, and normative sources for influencing party discipline (see Kam 2009; 
Andeweg and Thomassen 2010). Also, as Hazan (2000) points out, intraparty 
factionalism does not occur in a vacuum and is connected to public opinion in 
complicated ways – party factions may be driven by and responsive to cleavages in 
public opinion and may hinder party leaders’ abilities to ‘sell’ a policy to the public.  
 
PM Leadership 
Leaders are not all equally and rationally tuned to opposition within their parties or in 
parliament. Leaders also vary in their skills for and orientations toward conflict 
management. Thus, PM leadership style is another factor for parliamentary influence 
in security policy. PMs vary significantly in their background and experience, their 
beliefs and personality traits, their motivations for seeking office, and their preferred 
ways for gathering information, reviewing policy options, and dealing with conflict 
(Author 1997). Work on leaders in decision units research points to a key difference 
in leadership style – some leaders are much more open to information than others and 
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some are much more likely to challenge constraints (Hermann 2003). Some leaders 
may dismiss parliament as a distraction, while others believe it prudent or normatively 
ideal to consult parliament. 
In handling parliamentary opposition, leaders also often make mistakes – they 
misperceive the level and nature of the opposition (see Evans et al. 1993; Dyson 
2006), or they ineffectively manage the parliamentary process, opening the door to 
victory for intra-party or opposition voices. In the Turkish parliamentary vote not to 
allow Turkey to serve as a base in the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, for example, the 
political leadership was indecisive, wanted to defer responsibility, and assumed they 
would win without enforcing party discipline. As a result, they were quite surprised at 
their loss (Author 2010). 
As with the other factors of parliamentary influence, PM leadership style is not 
deterministic. A leader who correctly perceives the level of parliamentary opposition 
and takes steps to effectively address it may still lose a parliamentary vote. And 
leaders who mismanage parliamentary opposition may still ‘luck out’, with other 
factors affecting their parliamentary victory.  
 
 
Explaining the Commons’ Vote on Syria 
How well do the general factors of parliamentary influence account for the Syria 
vote? In this section, we consider the role of the factors identified above. We also 
explore other dynamics that were important in this case but have not been directly 
addressed in previous research on parliaments and security policy.  
 
Institutional, Legal and Constitutional Authority 
 15 
It is problematic to attribute Parliament’s role in this vote to any specific institutional, 
legal or constitutional authority. The UK Parliament is at the ‘weak’ end of a 
spectrum of control over security policy, in comparative perspective (White 2003; 
DCAF 2006; Dieterich et al. 2008; Peters and Wagner 2011). Deploying UK military 
force is a Royal Prerogative – ‘the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, 
which at any given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’, the executive 
(Dicey 1959: 24). The authority to deploy the UK’s armed forces, constitutionally, 
resides in the collective responsibility of the cabinet, led by the PM. This is consistent 
with the Westminster model of governance characterised by top-down decision-
making processes and centralisation of power; it is ‘a “power-hoarding” or “power-
concentrating” model of democracy’ (Gaskarth 2013: 28; see also Strong 2014;). 
Overall, UK cabinets have considerable ability to bypass parliament and the 
democratic process when making security policy (Burrall et al. 2006). 
There is no constitutional requirement to consult parliament in advance. Recent 
cases of deployment demonstrate this. The UK’s military missions in Afghanistan 
were never subject to a vote between the original deployment in 2001 and continued 
operations through 2010.  The 2011 deployment in Libya was only authorised post-
hoc by the Commons. Indeed, as Strong (2014: 5) notes the Commons ‘held a 
substantive vote over military action on just one occasion during the 20th century, 
over the Korean War.’ 
A focus on the Royal Prerogative and the centralisation of power in the 
Westminster Model ignores, however, some avenues of parliamentary influence in the 
UK. The parliamentary committee system, for example, allows MPs to scrutinise the 
work of government departments including those responsible for foreign affairs, 
security and defence. Recent developments, such as the election of committee chairs, 
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may serve to strengthen the influence of such committees. Beyond committees, 
Parliament has always reserved the power to talk about security policy. It does so 
frequently although it is not an especially effective tool for influence. Governments 
remain free to ignore such debates and, given that such debates are often adjournment 
debates, votes are rare and typically inconsequential. At times, however, 
parliamentary debates can influence policy. For example, Thatcher’s 1982 
deployment of a taskforce to the Falklands was connected to the uproar in the 
Commons, which met in emergency session (Moore 2013). Similarly, in the months-
long build-up to the Iraq war several MPs pressured Blair to hold a parliamentary 
debate and a substantive vote, which he ultimately did (Strong 2014). Underlying all 
of this is the reality that UK cabinets rely, for their survival, on commanding a 
parliamentary majority. Parliament thus retains capacity to bring down a government.  
The loss of confidence in PM Eden in 1957, for example, was connected to a security 
issue, namely the Suez crisis (Hennessy 2000).  
There are indications of changing norms and efforts to strengthen parliamentary 
authority in security policy, particularly since 2003 and the Commons’ vote on Iraq. 
Successive governments have, rhetorically at least, signalled their support for the 
notion that Blair’s action constituted a new precedent.4 Strong (2014: 2) argues that a 
‘Parliamentary Prerogative’ has evolved such that ‘Parliament now decides when 
Britain goes to war’. He traces this development from the 2003 Iraq vote, through 
Cameron’s decision in 2011 as the UK was participating in the use of force against 
Libya, to Cameron’s 2013 defeat on Syria.  
After 2003, a series of bills were considered to formalise the role of Parliament 
although none progressed far. Inquiries by committees of both the House of 
Commons (2004) and House of Lords (2006) concluded that steps should be taken to 
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strengthen the role of the UK Parliament. Despite these efforts, there was no 
movement on this issue during the 2005-2010 parliament.5 The coalition government 
that entered office in May 2010 expressed a willingness to formalise the precedent, 
with Foreign Secretary Hague suggesting to enshrine ‘in law for the future the 
necessity of consulting parliament on military action’ (Hansard 2011: Col. 799). 
Ultimately, however, no bill materialised and the record of parliamentary influence 
during the 2010-2015 parliament was inconsistent. 
Although the Commons authorised UK intervention in Libya in 2011, the vote 
occurred after the intervention had begun. The Commons thus approved a decision 
that had already been taken and put into effect by the PM and cabinet, in partnership 
with France and coordinated through NATO. Conscious of the difficulty involved in 
voting to bring troops back home days after they are sent into action, MPs secured an 
assurance from Hague that, in future, Parliament would be recalled to debate and vote 
prior to any deployment. Despite this assurance, in 2013 the UK government 
deployed military assets and military personnel (in non-combat roles) to Mali without 
a parliamentary vote. During 2013, as the Syrian situation deteriorated and Cameron 
signalled his desire to intervene in some capacity, the issue of parliament’s role 
resurfaced. In June 2013 there was some confusion within the cabinet as Hague 
suggested that any form of intervention, even if amounting to no more than arming 
the Syrian rebels, would be subject to a substantive vote in the Commons (The 
Guardian 2013). Days later, however, Cameron asserted that the government reserved 
the ‘ability to act very swiftly’ and without a parliamentary vote (BBC 2013a).  
It is thus impossible to attribute the role of the Commons in the Syrian vote 
simply to strengthened institutional or legal capacity. UK PMs may increasingly feel 
political pressure to hold a vote ahead of the deployment of military force, but they 
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are not constitutionally obliged to do so. Even if a norm of parliamentary prerogative 
has developed, votes remain rare (the 2011 vote on Libya was only the third vote on 
the use force since 1950) and, before 2013, Parliament had supported the PM in every 
matter of war and peace since 1782.  
 
Public Opinion 
The public nevertheless supported Parliament having a role in any decision to deploy 
UK military force in Syria. One survey revealed that 61 per cent of respondents 
believed that the government should take military action with parliamentary approval 
(all survey figures are from YouGov 2013). Despite lacking constitutional authority, 
Parliament convened knowing that public opinion was supportive of it constraining 
the government. Public opposition to UK military action was clear in the days 
preceding the vote. One survey showed strong opposition to both missile strikes 
against sites inside Syria (50 per cent opposing, 26 per cent supporting, 25 per cent 
undecided) and to providing military support to the anti-Assad forces (61 per cent 
opposing, 13 per cent supporting, 26 per cent undecided). The only potential action 
that received a relatively close net score was the use of UK military power to enforce 
a no-fly zone over Syria (42 per cent opposing, 34 per cent supporting, 24 per cent 
undecided). General scepticism was expressed in opinion polls throughout the year, 
although some of the public favoured some type of action. In May 2013, 38 per cent 
of respondents were supportive of surgical air strikes to destroy chemical weapons 
facilities with 36 per cent opposed. Even earlier, in February 2012, 40 per cent of 
those polled responded that a no fly zone over Syria was necessary. Although these 
precise questions were not replicated in August polling it seems that ‘opinion had 
hardened since the spring against any military action’ (Kellner 2013). 
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The salience of such public opinion to MPs was notable during the debate in the 
Commons. Speakers frequently invoked poll results and almost all references in the 
debate linked public opposition to fallout from Iraq, a topic to which we return below. 
Prominent figures, including former Labour foreign secretary Jack Straw and former 
Conservative defence secretary Liam Fox, also directly referenced public opposition 
(Hansard 2013: Cols. 1450, 1452). Other vocal and recognisable MPs raised the issue 
as well (Cols. 1475-76, 1479, 1483, 1506, 1508, 1513, 1515, 1521, 1535). 
Despite such frequent references, it is important to keep the role of public opinion 
in perspective. It is certainly not the case that the Commons simply followed the 
public. The tightness of the vote, and the fact that the vast majority of MPs cast a vote 
that kept the option of military force on the table, suggests that public opinion was not 
decisive. The mood of the public may, however, have played an indirect role. Had a 
majority of the public been supportive of military action Cameron may have 
committed and then held a retrospective vote, as with the 2011 Libya intervention. 
Such a scenario would have made it politically far more difficult for parliament to 
vote against the use of force (or, in that scenario, the continued use of force). 
Furthermore, public opinion – specifically a desire to be seen as both reflecting 
opinion and inflicting a defeat on the government in the name of public opinion – may 
have influenced Miliband’s decision not to back the government motion (BBC 2014).  
 
Coalition Government 
There is little evidence to suggest that the coalition itself (the first multiparty cabinet 
in the UK since 1945) was an important factor in this case. At no point did the Liberal 
Democrat party take a collective stance in opposition to the motion. Prominent figures 
within the junior coalition partner, including regarded experts in foreign affairs, spoke 
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publicly in support of the government motion (e.g. Ashdown 2013; and also Sir 
Menzies Campbell, see Hansard 2013: Col. 1455-57). Although the Liberal Democrat 
party president Tim Farron failed to vote for the government motion (although he did 
vote against Labour’s amendment), he remained relatively quiet in the days preceding 
the vote (Whitehead 2013).  
Clegg and other leading Liberal Democrat party figures authored an op-ed 
arguing for military action on the day of the vote (Clegg et al. 2013). Backing their 
leaders, the majority of MPs from both coalition parties voted for the government 
motion. Although it is true that some of the defection came from the Liberal 
Democrats (9 ‘no’ votes, or 16% of the parliamentary party), more of the 
government’s internal opposition came from within the Conservative party (30 ‘no’ 
votes, or 10% of the parliamentary party). It is difficult to know if a single-party 
Conservative government would have succeeded, given the messiness of the vote – 27 
Conservative MPs were absent (including 5 members of the government), along with 
8 Liberal Democrats (including 3 members of the government). 
Perhaps the only impact of the coalition government was in the chamber itself, as 
the closing speeches were given. The coalition parties shared the tasks of delivering 
the opening speech (by Cameron) and the closing remarks (by Clegg). It is generally 
accepted that Clegg’s speech for the government was weak (Wigmore 2013). Douglas 
Alexander observed: ‘I literally watched the government’s support draining away as 
the deputy PM tried to wind up his arguments before ten o’clock’ (BBC 2014). 
Alistair Burt, a foreign office minister at the time of the vote, echoed this sentiment: ‘I 
was assuming, and hoping, that the foreign secretary would close the debate. That 
turned out not to be the case’. He went on: ‘It was important to me because if anyone 
understood what was actually happening it was William Hague … During the course 
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of the wind-up ... he [Clegg] couldn’t speak with the authority of the foreign 
secretary’ (BBC 2014). 
If there was any possibility of a handful of wavering Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat MPs being won over by strong closing speeches – and that is mere 
speculation – then Clegg’s speech was arguably ill-suited to the task. The important 
point, however, is that the leadership of both parties in the coalition supported the 
government motion, as did the majority of MPs from their parties. Rather than 
coalition politics, or inter-party tensions, playing a decisive role in this defeat, intra-
party divisions were far more significant.  
 
Intraparty Factionalism 
Both the Conservative and Liberal Democrat parties were internally divided on this 
issue. The Liberal Democrats are typically cautious over military action, adopting a 
multilateral, law-based approach to international affairs (Liberal Democrats 2010). 
The party opposed the 2003 war in Iraq in ‘an extremely rare instance of dissent’ from 
a tradition of cross-party consensus in foreign policy (Gaskarth 2013: 31). On the eve 
of the vote, Liberal Democrats MPs were sceptical that the evidence presented 
justified the planned intervention and the perception, it was reported, was that ‘the 
wider political leadership ... [was] going to have to work a lot harder to get them on 
side’ (Morris 2013). The concerns of those rebels or abstainers, who spoke publicly, 
either in the Commons or afterwards in the media, were broadly consistent. They saw 
a vote for the government motion as a first step towards inevitable military action. 
This point was well captured by one Liberal Democrat MP’s comment that the motion 
‘puts a firm foot on the slippery slope towards military intervention ... by creating a 
climate and the mood music which makes it easier for such action to be taken in the 
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future’ (Hansard 2013: Col. 1519). Other Liberal Democrat MPs echoed this ‘slippery 
slope’ argument (Col. 1499-1500).  
Furthermore, Liberal Democrat rebels were both sceptical of the practical effect 
of any military strikes, with many favouring the continuation of humanitarian 
assistance and supporting a firmer UN process. At minimum a UN process required 
time for inspections to conclude. Several rebels argued for UN authorisation as 
prerequisite for any strikes. Liberal Democrats thus seemed divided between those 
content to vote for the government motion and accept its commitment to a second 
vote at face value, and those who doubted that commitment and who were sceptical of 
both the practical effect of military strikes and the legitimacy of action absent clear 
UN authorisation. Considering abstentions and absences, only 32 Liberal Democrat 
MPs out of a total of 57 (just 56 per cent) voted for the government, with 9 rebelling, 
a poor result for the party leadership. 
Conservative intraparty factionalism was critical to the vote’s outcome. In total, 
thirty Conservative MPs rebelled, with a further nine abstaining whilst voting against 
the Labour amendment. Twenty-seven Conservative MPs were absent entirely. 
Previous research has demonstrated that the 2010 Parliament is, by historical 
standards, rebellious (Cowley and Stuart 2012a). Factionalism was evident early in 
the 2010 parliament with many new members at odds with the leadership on issues 
such as defence, taxation, and business. UK foreign policy is an issue that has 
revealed particularly deep differences although the focal point is often Europe 
(Cowley and Stuart 2012b). Using Heppell’s mapping of the Conservative 
parliamentary party under Cameron, it is clear that the majority of rebellious MPs (18 
out of 30, or 22 out of 39 if we count abstentions) in the Syrian vote were from a 
section of the parliamentary party populated by ‘the implacable critics of Cameron’ 
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(Heppell 2013: 348). These are MPs who are both hard eurosceptics and socially 
conservative, standing opposed to the soft euroscepticism and liberal conservatism of 
Cameron. 
These MPs emphasised the pragmatic shortcomings of any proposed missile 
strike. Rebels and abstainers raised questions about the impact of strikes, arguing that 
it would not degrade Assad’s chemical weapons stock, would do little to protect 
Syrian civilians, and could escalate the conflict and draw the UK in further. However, 
45 MPs who can also be characterised as hard eurosceptics voted for the government 
motion. Within the Conservatives, there was thus a range of disparate views about the 
prudence of military strikes.  
 
PM Leadership 
Cameron’s leadership style, and broader party management processes, exacerbated 
intraparty tensions, particularly those within the Conservative party. As one 
backbench Conservative MP put it, ‘it all comes down to loyalty. Who do you want to 
be loyal to, your prime minister or your constituents? The point is that backbenchers 
know that Cameron doesn’t really mean it, that he wouldn’t die in a ditch for them’ 
(Hardman 2013b). Such underlying tensions were aggravated by a distinct sense of 
confidence in Cameron’s approach. Recalling Parliament in such a haphazard manner, 
attempting to rush through a vote before the UN inspectors completed their work, and 
refusing to disclose comprehensively the legal advice received by the UK 
Government, were all signs that Cameron underestimated the degree of opposition.  
In addition, there are indications that the vote itself was poorly managed. 
Complicating matters considerably was Miliband’s late decision to table an 
amendment and instruct Labour MPs to vote against the government. Had Miliband 
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not done this, almost certainly the government motion would have passed and likely 
with a huge majority.6 Alistair Burt observed that this ‘changed the arithmetic very 
markedly … I was puzzled because the relationship with Labour on foreign affairs 
had always been a good one’ (BBC 2014). However, Cameron could also have 
accepted the Labour amendment. Such a move would have been politically dangerous 
as it would have allowed Miliband to claim the had steered the agenda, but it would 
have kept the UK on track to support any future led military action. 
The day before the vote The Spectator observed that because Labour support 
might not come ‘until the last minute, it’s reasonable to expect that the [government] 
whips will be getting to work today’ (Hardman 2013a). Once Labour’s support was 
withdrawn, on the morning of the vote, the government was left with little time to 
organise and to convince their backbenchers to support its motion. Yet the necessary 
work had not gone in, over the preceding days, to secure support. Jim Fitzpatrick, a 
Labour MP who had served as a whip in the run-up to the 2003 Iraq vote, observed: 
‘The government whips office had a mountain to climb. They clearly hadn’t had the 
opportunity to do the kind of work we’d done pre-2003 … The terms were changing, 
the motion changed, the tone of the government response changed … It looked like a 
botched job, which, for the whip’s office, is a cardinal sin’ (BBC 2014). A prudent 
Conservative leadership would have anticipated the need to mobilise support since 
Conservative backbenchers had previous signalled their worries about Cameron’s 
eagerness to involve the UK in the Syrian conflict (Huffington Post 2013).  
One senior backbench Conservative cited this poor party management and a 
failure to prepare the ground as pivotal in the loss (Lilley 2013). In the days before the 
vote, scepticism amongst as many as 70 Conservative MPs was reported, deriving 
from a combination of a rushed timetable and a failure to make a compelling case for 
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intervention (Mason 2013). As the debate proceeded in the Commons, government 
whips were engaged in a too little, too late effort to bring rebels on board. Notes were 
passed around the chamber, wavering MPs were called in for last minute meetings 
with ministers and senior advisers, and party loyalty was invoked. However, the 
groundwork had not been laid in the days and weeks prior (BBC 2014). 
Numerous news stories in the aftermath of the vote reported that Cameron and his 
senior Cabinet colleagues did not meet privately with many wavering backbenchers. 
According to the Financial Times, ‘plenty of rebels have told us in the last 48 hours 
they were not properly consulted before the vote, and that they might have changed 
their mind had they been talked through the prime minister’s reasoning’ (Stacey 
2013). Similar criticism was directed at the government whips office (Rigby 2013; 
Groves 2013). In The Telegraph, a Conservative MP was quoted as saying that it felt 
like the whips just ‘couldn’t be bothered’ (Dominiczak and Tweedie 2013). Summing 
up, one Conservative minister was quoted saying, ‘it was a catalogue of errors. 
Bringing back parliament in a rush; failing to get Ed Miliband on board; failing to eke 
out enough support for the government motion despite having a working majority of 
84: the whole thing is a shambles’ (Rigby 2013).  
 
The Ghosts of Iraq and the Shadow of Tony Blair 
A final contributing factor to Parliament’s role and the outcome of this vote, and one 
that has not been explored in previous research on parliamentary influence, was the 
memory of the Blair government’s decision to support the U.S. war against Iraq in 
2003 and a more general sense of war fatigue. George Osborne, the UK Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, when asked about the Syria vote, remarked, ‘we just found a lot of 
fatigue about foreign intervention ... I would like the West to be more engaged but I 
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have to accept that that is not where British public opinion, and that is not where 
parliamentary opinion is’ (Charlie Rose 2013). This response draws together many of 
the threads from the previous sections. Public opinion was clearly a factor but, rather 
than being a specific opposition to this military strike, there seemed to be ‘a diffuse 
sense of public “fatigue” with overseas military interventions’ (Clement 2012). As the 
debate was unfolding in Parliament, The Spectator magazine ran a story about how 
Cameron was attacking Blair’s ‘ghost’ complete with a picture of Blair’s spectre 
floating over the chamber (Hardman 2013c). Indeed, Cameron observed in his 
opening statement that ‘the well of public opinion was well and truly poisoned by the 
Iraq episode’ (Hansard 2013: Col. 1428). 
Cameron dedicated a significant portion of his opening speech to differences 
between Iraq in 2003 and Syria in 2013 (Col. 1427-28). Yet during the debate, MPs 
returned to the case of Iraq and specifically to the abuse of intelligence that led MPs 
to support that effort. Miliband led the charge, framing much of his opening statement 
around ‘the fact that we have got to learn the lessons of Iraq’ (Col. 1433). Based on 
comments in the debate, such lessons included the appropriate and transparent use of 
intelligence, the soundness of the legal advice issued by the Attorney General (an 
issue that proved so divisive during and subsequent to the decision-making about 
Iraq), and the more general issue of trust in the government. A few MPs attempted to 
turn the issue of Iraq on its head, arguing either that the security and intelligence 
services must surely have learned the relevant lessons, or that the tragedy of the Iraq 
intervention should not be used to create the double tragedy of abandoning those in 
Syria who need assistance. In his closing statement, Clegg also invoked the ‘double 
tragedy’ (Col. 1546) argument but overall, the frequent invocations of Iraq held 
negative connotations. 
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Given that the vote came less than two years after MPs (the same set of MPs) 
backed the UK’s intervention in Libya it may be far-fetched to read the 2013 vote as 
an abandonment of the UK’s global role and interventionism because of the ghosts of 
Iraq in 2003. Rather, it seems that the complexity of the specific case and the shadow 
cast by Iraq combined to prevent Cameron from winning the vote at that time.  
Furthermore, one year following the Syrian vote, on 26 September 2014, Cameron 
secured a large parliament majority (524 votes to 43) for UK military intervention in 
Iraq to combat the growing threat of the Islamic State. There were several aspects of 
the 2014 Iraq intervention that made it easier for Cameron to secure parliamentary 
support. By the time the Commons convened to debate and vote, the Iraqi government 
had requested foreign assistance in their military struggle with the Islamic State and 
the U.S. had already committed to the operation. Cameron had also secured the 
explicit support of Miliband. With some MPs arguing, in that debate, in favour of 
extending the campaign against Islamic State into Syria, and with the PM stating that 
he reserved the right to act in the national interest or in an emergency before a 
parliamentary vote (Hansard 2014: Col. 1265), the debate was a stark reminder that 
the relationship between PMs and parliament son matters of war and peace remains a 
complicated and fascinating one. 
 
 
Conclusion 
This case, although unique for the UK, is consistent with what we know about 
parliamentary influence in security policy. It supports the view that the important 
factors for parliamentary influence are dynamic, in that they can change form from 
case to case and may evolve within an occasion for decision. Our analysis suggests 
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that the Commons’ influence did not derive from a deep, structural shift in 
parliamentary authority, but rather from several mutually reinforcing factors – indirect 
influence of public opinion, intraparty factionalism, mismanagement by the 
leadership, and the spectre of Iraq. The formal powers of parliament remained weak 
although the norm of involving parliament in decisions to deploy military force 
arguably led Cameron to recall parliament. 
In this case public opinion was a significant, but indirect, factor. While public 
scepticism may explain Cameron’s decision to recall parliament, Miliband’s 
positioning of the Labour party, and the decision of some MPs to vote against the 
government, politicians did not blindly follow public opinion.  This is evident from 
the closeness of the vote and the reality that a majority of MPs voted to retain the 
option of force. This is consistent with research demonstrating that united elites can 
ignore or shape public opinion. It was division among elites that allowed for some 
representation of public opinion in the form of a parliamentary debate and vote. 
Contra to some democratic peace research, in this case the junior coalition partner 
did not act as a brake on military action. The divided elite in this case was not the 
result of coalition politics; the governing parties were in agreement. The key division 
was within the Conservative party, the senior coalition partner, and was linked to 
longer-standing intraparty tensions. This is consistent with previous research on the 
constraining role party factions can play. It also suggests that further research is 
required on the role of political parties, and their ideological commitments and 
disagreements, in the area of foreign policy. Little systematic research exists on the 
topic (see Rathbun 2004; Özkececi-Taner 2009). 
Intraparty factionalism does not translate automatically into parliamentary 
influence. A range of disciplinary and persuasive methods is available to party 
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leaders. Yet in this case party management was critically lacking. This is consistent 
with previous research, which shows that not all leaders respond rationally to 
constraints and challenges. Cameron seemed to misperceive the opposition on his 
own backbenches and underestimate the leadership required to secure votes. 
A critical factor in this case that has no foundation in past work on parliaments 
and security policy is the significance of historical context. The ‘ghosts’ of Iraq and 
Blair affected both public and MP opinion. But this history was not determinate – the 
UK was willing to intervene in Libya (2011) and Iraq (2014) and the Syria vote was 
very close. We are unaware of work on the role of historical precedent as a factor 
enhancing parliamentary influence but similar instances come to mind. The passage 
of the War Powers Act by the U.S. Congress in 1973 was a reaction to Congressional 
weakness in the Vietnam War. Dutch deployments of troops in Afghanistan have been 
subject to delays and oversight by the Dutch parliament stemming from concerns to 
avoid another disaster like that experienced by Dutch troops in Srebrenica (Saideman 
and Auerswald 2012). 
Research on individual-level information processing suggests that historical 
analogies and case-based reasoning can serve as a prism through which a current 
policy choice is perceived, evaluated, and acted upon (Khong 1992; Bruening 2003). 
Past experience may affect policy preferences, levels of trust, and policymaking 
processes. Iraq and Blair served as shortcuts and bases for arguments for more time, 
more evidence, and more involvement by parliament as a check on the executive. The 
role of historical precedent seems a particularly fruitful and novel area for research on 
parliaments and foreign policy. 
Overall, although some aspects of this case seem fairly idiosyncratic (for example 
two government ministers failed to hear the bell calling them to vote), the case 
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resonates with extant research that points to dynamic constellations of factors beyond 
structural contexts and institutional rules. The Commons vote helps us better 
understand these factors and how they interact to enhance parliamentary influence in 
security policy.  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
NOTES 
1 In 1782 Lord North, then PM, lost a vote of no confidence following the British defeat at Yorktown. 
2 The Labour amendment differed in setting out a clearer and more structured role for the UN in any 
intervention and in calling for compelling evidence that the Syrian government was responsible for the 
chemical attacks.  
3 For more detailed discussion of how this research challenges the conventional wisdom on 
parliamentary influence in foreign policy, see Author (2010). 
4 For some efforts to increase parliament’s involvement prior to the Iraq war see White (2003). 
5 In testimony to the House of Lords the former foreign secretary Jack Straw suggested that the reason 
for inaction was simply a failure of the Brown government to prioritise the issue. Nick Clegg, Deputy 
Prime Minister in the 2010-15 coalition government, observed that internal disagreement remained an 
obstacle within government to any bill formalising the convention of Commons’ involvement and a 
vote (House of Lords 2013). 
6 This remains one of the most bizarre aspects of the vote. 490 MPs in total voted for a motion that left 
open the possibility of a second vote, which may have authorized the use of UK military force. But 
those 490 votes were divided between a government motion and an opposition amendment. Both the 
PM and the leader of the opposition were in favour of keeping the possibility of using military force on 
the table and yet, following the vote, both were quick to declare publicly that such action was no longer 
an option.  
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